---
reference_key: mitre-t1558-003
title: "MITRE ATT&CK T1558.003 --- Kerberoasting"
url: "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/"
availability: available
capture_method: primary
captured_at: 2026-06-23T03:32:11Z
document_id: REF-mitre-t1558-003
---

# MITRE ATT&CK T1558.003 --- Kerberoasting

| Field | Value |
|-------|-------|
| **Reference key** | `mitre-t1558-003` |
| **Availability** | AVAILABLE |
| **Capture method** | `primary` |
| **Source type** | remote_url |
| **URL / path** | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/ |
| **Captured (UTC)** | 2026-06-23T03:32:11Z |
| **Content type** | text/html; charset=utf-8 |
| **HTTP status** | 200 |

## Boardroom Citation Context

Red/Blue kerberoast on svc-llm-ingest.

## Source Location

https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003/





## Captured Content

```text
Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting, Sub-technique T1558.003 - Enterprise | MITRE ATT&CK Matrices Enterprise Mobile ICS Tactics Enterprise Mobile ICS Techniques Enterprise Mobile ICS Defenses Mitigations Enterprise Mobile ICS Assets Detections Detection Strategies Analytics Data Components CTI Groups Software Campaigns Resources Get Started Learn More about ATT&CK ATT&CK Advisory Council ATT&CKcon ATT&CK Data & Tools FAQ Engage with ATT&CK Version History Updates Legal & Branding Benefactors Contribute Blog Search ATT&CKcon 7.0 is coming October 27-28, 2026. Learn more about ATT&CKcon 7.0 and submit your proposal . Home Techniques Enterprise Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Kerberoasting Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting Other sub-techniques of Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets (5) ID Name T1558.001 Golden Ticket T1558.002 Silver Ticket T1558.003 Kerberoasting T1558.004 AS-REP Roasting T1558.005 Ccache Files Adversaries may abuse a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) or sniff network traffic to obtain a ticket-granting service (TGS) ticket that may be vulnerable to Brute Force . [1] [2] Service principal names (SPNs) are used to uniquely identify each instance of a Windows service. To enable authentication, Kerberos requires that SPNs be associated with at least one service logon account (an account specifically tasked with running a service [3] ). [4] [5] [6] [7] Adversaries possessing a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) may request one or more Kerberos ticket-granting service (TGS) service tickets for any SPN from a domain controller (DC). [1] [2] Portions of these tickets may be encrypted with the RC4 algorithm, meaning the Kerberos 5 TGS-REP etype 23 hash of the service account associated with the SPN is used as the private key and is thus vulnerable to offline Brute Force attacks that may expose plaintext credentials. [2] [1] [7] This same behavior could be executed using service tickets captured from network traffic. [2] Cracked hashes may enable Persistence , Privilege Escalation , and Lateral Movement via access to Valid Accounts . [6] ID: T1558.003 Sub-technique of: T1558  Tactic: Credential Access  Platforms: Windows Contributors: Praetorian Version: 1.3 Created: 11 February 2020 Last Modified: 24 October 2025 Version Permalink Live Version Procedure Examples ID Name Description S1063 Brute Ratel C4 Brute Ratel C4 can decode Kerberos 5 tickets and convert it to hashcat format for subsequent cracking. [8] S0363 Empire Empire uses PowerSploit 's Invoke-Kerberoast to request service tickets and return crackable ticket hashes. [9] G0046 FIN7 FIN7 has used Kerberoasting PowerShell commands such as, Invoke-Kerberoast for credential access and to enable lateral movement. [10] [11] S0357 Impacket Impacket modules like GetUserSPNs can be used to get Service Principal Names (SPNs) for user accounts. The output is formatted to be compatible with cracking tools like John the Ripper and Hashcat. [12] G0119 Indrik Spider Indrik Spider has conducted Kerberoasting attacks using a module from GitHub. [13] C0049 Leviathan Australian Intrusions Leviathan used Kerberoasting techniques during Leviathan Australian Intrusions . [14] C0014 Operation Wocao During Operation Wocao , threat actors used PowerSploit 's Invoke-Kerberoast module to request encrypted service tickets and bruteforce the passwords of Windows service accounts offline. [15] S0194 PowerSploit PowerSploit 's Invoke-Kerberoast module can request service tickets and return crackable ticket hashes. [16] [7] S1071 Rubeus Rubeus can use the KerberosRequestorSecurityToken.GetRequest method to request kerberoastable service tickets. [17] S0692 SILENTTRINITY SILENTTRINITY contains a module to conduct Kerberoasting. [18] C0024 SolarWinds Compromise During the SolarWinds Compromise , APT29 obtained Ticket Granting Service (TGS) tickets for Active Directory Service Principle Names to crack offline. [19] G0102 Wizard Spider Wizard Spider has used Rubeus, MimiKatz Kerberos module, and the Invoke-Kerberoast cmdlet to steal AES hashes. [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] Mitigations ID Mitigation Description M1041 Encrypt Sensitive Information Enable AES Kerberos encryption (or another stronger encryption algorithm), rather than RC4, where possible. [2] M1027 Password Policies Ensure strong password length (ideally 25+ characters) and complexity for service accounts and that these passwords periodically expire. [2] Also consider using Group Managed Service Accounts or another third party product such as password vaulting. [2] M1026 Privileged Account Management Limit service accounts to minimal required privileges, including membership in privileged groups such as Domain Administrators. [2] Detection Strategy ID Name Analytic ID Analytic Description DET0157 Detect Kerberoasting Attempts (T1558.003) AN0444 Detects Kerberoasting attempts by monitoring for anomalous Kerberos TGS requests (Event ID 4769) with RC4 encryption (etype 0x17), accounts requesting an unusual number of service tickets in a short period, or service accounts targeted outside normal usage baselines. Also correlates suspicious process activity (e.g., Mimikatz invoking LSASS access) with Kerberos ticket anomalies. References EmpireProject. (2016, October 31). Invoke-Kerberoast.ps1. Retrieved March 22, 2018. Metcalf, S. (2015, December 31). Cracking Kerberos TGS Tickets Using Kerberoast  Exploiting Kerberos to Compromise the Active Directory Domain. Retrieved March 22, 2018. Bani, M. (2018, February 23). Detecting Kerberoasting activity using Azure Security Center. Retrieved March 23, 2018. Microsoft. (n.d.). Service Principal Names. Retrieved March 22, 2018. Microsoft. (2010, April 13). Service Principal Names (SPNs) SetSPN Syntax (Setspn.exe). Retrieved March 22, 2018. Medin, T. (2014, November). Attacking Kerberos - Kicking the Guard Dog of Hades. Retrieved March 22, 2018. Schroeder, W. (2016, November 1). Kerberoasting Without Mimikatz. Retrieved September 23, 2024. Harbison, M. and Renals, P. (2022, July 5). When Pentest Tools Go Brutal: Red-Teaming Tool Being Abused by Malicious Actors. Retrieved February 1, 2023. Schroeder, W., Warner, J., Nelson, M. (n.d.). Github PowerShellEmpire. Retrieved April 28, 2016. Loui, E. and Reynolds, J. (2021, August 30). CARBON SPIDER Embraces Big Game Hunting, Part 1. Retrieved September 20, 2021. Abdo, B., et al. (2022, April 4). FIN7 Power Hour: Adversary Archaeology and the Evolution of FIN7. Retrieved April 5, 2022. SecureAuth. (n.d.). Retrieved January 15, 2019. Mandiant Intelligence. (2022, June 2). To HADES and Back: UNC2165 Shifts to LOCKBIT to Evade Sanctions. Retrieved July 29, 2024. CISA et al. (2024, July 8). Peoples Republic of China (PRC) Ministry of State Security APT40 Tradecraft in Action. Retrieved February 3, 2025. Dantzig, M. v., Schamper, E. (2019, December 19). Operation Wocao: Shining a light on one of Chinas hidden hacking groups. Retrieved October 8, 2020. Schroeder, W. & Hart M. (2016, October 31). Invoke-Kerberoast. Retrieved March 23, 2018. Harmj0y. (n.d.). Rubeus. Retrieved March 29, 2023. Salvati, M. (2019, August 6). SILENTTRINITY Modules. Retrieved March 24, 2022. MSTIC, CDOC, 365 Defender Research Team. (2021, January 20). Deep dive into the Solorigate second-stage activation: From SUNBURST to TEARDROP and Raindrop . Retrieved January 22, 2021. The DFIR Report. (2020, October 8). Ryuks Return. Retrieved October 9, 2020. Kimberly Goody, Jeremy Kennelly, Joshua Shilko, Steve Elovitz, Douglas Bienstock. (2020, October 28). Unhappy Hour Special: KEGTAP and SINGLEMALT With a Ransomware Chaser. Retrieved October 28, 2020. DHS/CISA. (2020, October 28). Ransomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and Public Health Sector. Retrieved October 28, 2020. The DFIR Report. (2020, November 5). Ryuk Speed Run, 2 Hours to Ransom. Retrieved November 6, 2020. Shilko, J., et al. (2021, October 7). FIN12: The Prolific Ransomware Intrusion Threat Actor That Has Aggressively Pursued Healthcare Targets. Retrieved June 15, 2023.  Core Objects: All Core ATT&CK Objects All None Matrices Tactics Techniques Sub-Techniques Defenses: All Defenses All None Mitigations Assets Detection Strategies Analytics Data Components CTI: All CTI All None Groups Software Campaigns Reference: All Reference All None Resources Domains: All Domains All None Enterprise Mobile ICS Reset filters Contact Us Terms of Use Privacy Policy Website Changelog Cookie Preferences  2015 - 2026, The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation.
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---

*Archived reference article for AICSR-STUDY-2026-001 footnote corpus.*
